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Collision Course: How Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) Has Silently Undermined the 
Prohibition on American Pipe Tolling During Appeals 
of Class Certification Denials 
INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Calderon v. 
Presidio Valley Farmers Association1 is unremarkable. Calderon, a 
class action brought on behalf of a group of Mexican farm workers, 
arose from numerous alleged violations of the Farm Labor 
Contractor Act.2 Although the Western District of Texas initially 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the Fifth Circuit 
agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the question and, phrasing 
its decision diplomatically, “invited” the district court to reconsider 
the issue.3 This victory, however, would be short-lived for a small 
group of class members. 
A group of then unnamed plaintiffs submitted class claim forms 
following the Western District of Texas’s decision to certify a class.4 
Surprisingly, though, the district court held that the unnamed 
plaintiffs’ claims were now time-barred, despite their initial 
timeliness.5 Indeed, the unnamed plaintiffs’ claims became untimely 
in the period between the initial, erroneous denial of class 
certification and the subsequent decision to certify the class.6 The 
untimeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims was a result of the rules on 
class action tolling, the jurisprudential doctrine which holds that the 
filing of a class action suspends the running of a claim’s statute of 
limitations against all putative members of the class.7 The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed that the tolling effect ceased upon the denial of 
class certification and began again when the class was certified.8 
Because the plaintiffs failed to intervene in the action or file 
independent actions during the period between the initial class 
certification denial and its subsequent reversal, the statute of 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by KEVIN WELSH. 
 1. 863 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
 2. Id. at 386. 
 3. Id. at 389. 
 4. Id. at 390. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983). 
The tolling of a statute of limitations is equivalent to a suspension of prescription 
under Louisiana law. Compare id., with LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596 (2012). 
 8. See Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390. 
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limitations continued to run and the claims became untimely.9 Thus, 
despite the timeliness of the initial action and appropriate notice to 
the defendants,10 the unnamed plaintiffs lost the ability to state a 
claim against the defendant solely because the district court initially 
and erroneously decided against class certification.11 This situation 
is undoubtedly a “worst case scenario” under the widely held notion 
that procedure alone should not, without good reason, foreclose on a 
party’s ability to argue a claim’s merits.12 
The loss that the Calderon plaintiffs suffered is the most 
egregious consequence of the widely followed judicial policy of 
ending a class action’s tolling effect immediately upon a district 
court’s denial of class certification.13 In the past, some courts have 
examined the policy and concluded that the realistic costs of tolling 
beyond the denial of class certification were simply too high—
tolling would often extend through final judgment, which may come 
years after a class certification decision, thereby forcing defendants 
to defend stale claims.14 The prospect of multiyear tolling arose 
from the historical difficulty of achieving interlocutory review of 
class certification decisions.15 However, the entire landscape of 
interlocutory appeals in this area was altered in 1998 by the 
promulgation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which 
provides a special mechanism for nearly immediate appellate review 
of class certification decisions.16 To date, federal circuit courts of 
appeal have not responded to the fact that Rule 23(f) seriously 
                                                                                                             
 9. See id.  
 10. A properly pled class action complaint is commonly understood to give a 
defendant notice of the type and number of claims that he or she faces. See Am. 
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974). 
 11. See Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390. 
 12. See, e.g., TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 
2001) (noting that there is an “overriding judicial goal of deciding cases correctly, 
on the basis of their legal and factual merits”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 
(1962) (“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be 
a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim 
on the merits.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir. 
1995); Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390; Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 
1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 
F.3d 510, 519–21 (5th Cir. 2008); Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip 
Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 
2000); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149–50 (6th Cir. 1988).  
 14. See Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390. 
 15. See infra Part I.B.1. The interlocutory appeal in Calderon was an 
exception to this general rule.  
 16. See infra Part I.B.3.  
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undermines the logic of ceasing tolling upon the denial of class 
certification.17  
This Comment argues that the policy of ending tolling 
immediately upon the initial denial of class certification contradicts 
the very purposes of class action tolling and can lead to prejudicial 
results, as Calderon demonstrates. Part I of this Comment examines 
the development of class action tolling and the evolution of 
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions. Part II explores 
the interrelationship between class action tolling and interlocutory 
appeals of class certification rulings by discussing bellwether 
decisions on the issue, including the opinions that have linked the 
tolling policy observed in Calderon to the historical rarity of 
interlocutory appeals. Part III challenges the current jurisprudence 
on the grounds that it incentivizes many behaviors that Rule 23 and 
class action tolling seek to avoid, fails to recognize the vast changes 
in interlocutory appellate practice ushered in by Rule 23(f), causes 
litigants to be treated unequally due to an initial, erroneous 
certification decision, and fails to protect plaintiffs from Calderon-
like prejudice. Part IV of this Comment proposes an alternative 
approach to the issue’s current jurisprudential treatment. 
Specifically, it argues that tolling should continue through the time 
period available for requesting interlocutory review of a class 
certification decision under Rule 23(f) and, where a circuit court 
grants review, through final resolution of the certification issue. This 
proposal, which is based in part on the approach taken by 
Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure, simultaneously protects 
plaintiffs from unnecessary harm, evens the pretrial playing field, 
and furthers Rule 23’s goals of efficiency and economy in litigation. 
Finally, Part IV contextualizes the proposed rule by assessing recent 
scholarship on class action tolling.  
I. THE LANDSCAPE 
A. The Class Action and Statutes of Limitations  
The class action’s defining characteristic is representation.18 
Class actions depend on a legal fiction that instructs courts to treat 
unnamed class members as if they were named parties in the 
action.19 Indeed, Rule 23 “both permits and encourages class 
                                                                                                             
 17. See infra Part II.  
 18. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (“A federal 
class action is . . . truly [a] representative suit . . . .”).  
 19. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th 
Cir. 2008).  
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members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims.”20 The 
class action’s representative nature necessarily has consequences for 
the running of statutes of limitations—because class actions involve, 
by definition, the vindication of a nonparty’s rights, there must be a 
mechanism to regulate the application of a statute of limitations to 
unnamed class members’ claims. However, the underlying pressures 
of class actions and limitations periods are often difficult to manage 
in practice.21  
1. The Creation of Class Action Tolling: American Pipe & 
Construction Company v. Utah 
The first effort to reconcile the representative nature of the class 
action and the running of statutes of limitations against unnamed 
class members came in the 1974 United States Supreme Court 
decision American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah, which 
involved claims arising under the Sherman Act.22 In 1964, members 
of the steel and concrete pipe industries were indicted by a federal 
grand jury for conspiring to restrain their market through collusive 
bidding and business allocation.23 Four days after the defendants’ 
plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges, the United States 
brought civil actions in the Central District of California to enjoin 
further violations of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the 
False Claims Act.24 After extended negotiations, the United States 
and “the companies consented to a decree enjoining them from 
engaging in certain specified future violations of the antitrust 
laws.”25 A final judgment was rendered on May 24, 1968.26 
On May 13, 1969, the State of Utah commenced a class action 
against the same defendants for Sherman Act27 violations. Utah’s 
suit purported to represent “public bodies and agencies of the state 
and local government in the State of Utah who are end users of pipe 
acquired from the defendants.”28 The district court found the action 
timely because 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) then provided that the statute of 
                                                                                                             
 20. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1983).  
 21. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The Impropriety 
of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 532, 535 (1996) (“[C]lass actions and statutes of limitation[s] do not interact 
harmoniously.”). For an example of another area of contention involving the class 
action and statutes of limitations, see infra Part IV.C.  
 22. 414 U.S. at 541.  
 23. Id. at 540.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 540–41 (footnote omitted).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 541. Utah brought its action under 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
 28. Id.  
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limitations remained “suspended during the pendency [of an action 
by the United States] and for one year thereafter.”29 The class action 
was filed with eleven days remaining in the limitations period.30  
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), the 
defendants moved for a declaration that the suit could not be 
maintained as a class action.31 The district court granted the motion, 
finding that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) was not 
satisfied.32 On December 12, 1969, roughly seven months after Utah 
first filed its action and eight days after the district court rendered its 
class viability decision, more than 60 governmental entities from 
Utah moved to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) (intervention of right) 
or, in the alternative, Rule 24(b)(2) (permissive intervention).33 The 
district court denied the motions to intervene, finding that “the 
limitations period . . . had run as to all these respondents and had not 
been tolled by the institution of the class action in their behalf.”34 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the intervention denial as a matter of 
right but reversed the denial of permissive intervention, rejecting the 
district court’s conclusion that the intervening parties were time-
barred.35 The Ninth Circuit predicated its decision on the legal 
fiction that the intervenors’ claims were filed when Utah initially 
brought the class claim eleven days before the limitations period had 
run.36 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the issue.37 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the 
issue of tolling.38 The Court began its analysis by examining the 
principal purpose of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23.39 Prior to 
1966, Rule 23 “contained no mechanism for determining . . . any 
point in advance of final judgment which [alleged class members] 
were actual [parties that] would be bound by the judgment.”40 
According to the Court, “[a] recurrent source of abuse under [pre-
1966 Rule 23] lay in the potential that members of the claimed class 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 541–42 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. at 542. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 543. To have a class certified, the named plaintiff must demonstrate, 
inter alia, that the class device is required because conventional joinder of all 
similarly situated plaintiffs is impracticable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  
 33. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543–44. 
 34. Id. at 544 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 35. Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 
414 U.S. 538 (1974).  
 36. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 545. 
 37. See id.  
 38. Id. at 561. 
 39. See id. at 545–46. 
 40. See id.  
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could in some situations await developments in the trial or even final 
judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation 
would be favorable to their interests.”41 The Court noted that “[t]he 
1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically to mend this 
perceived defect in [Rule 23] and to assure that members of the class 
would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by 
all subsequent orders and judgments.”42 These 1966 changes to Rule 
23, which served as part of an overarching revision,43 established the 
“opt-out” nature of Rule 23(b)(3) classes.44 
Because post-1966 Rule 23 generally binds an unnamed class 
member to the named plaintiff’s action unless and until she chooses 
to opt out, “the filing of a timely class action complaint commences 
the action for all members of the class as subsequently 
determined.”45 The legal fiction that a class action serves as an 
action on behalf of all putative class members is intended to have 
pragmatic benefits—as the Supreme Court explained, “[a] federal 
class action is no longer ‘an invitation to joinder’ but a truly 
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, 
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”46  
After its examination of the nature of the post-1966 federal class 
action, the Court addressed the issue of whether Utah’s initial class 
action suspended the running of the limitations period for the 
putative class members that intervened in the action. The Court held 
that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running 
of the statute for all purported members of the class who make 
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status,”47 even if the unnamed plaintiff 
was initially unaware of the action.48 A “contrary rule” would 
“deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of 
litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.”49 The 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 547. 
 42. Id. (citation omitted). 
 43. Robert G. Bone & Davis S. Evans, Class Certification and the 
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1259 (2002).  
 44. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (“[Notice to certify Rule 23(b)(3) 
classes] must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . . 
the binding effect of a class judgment on members . . . .”); Severtson v. Phillips 
Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264 (D. Minn. 1991) (“Under Rule 23, all persons 
falling within the class definition are considered members of the class, and 
therefore bound by the result in the case, unless they affirmatively ‘opt-out’ of the 
case.” (citation omitted)). 
 45. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 46. See id. (emphasis added). 
 47. See id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 551.  
 49. See id. at 553. 
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Court reasoned that the new rule was consistent with the ultimate 
purposes of statutes of limitations: 
The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and 
of barring a plaintiff who “has slept on his rights” are 
satisfied when . . . a named [plaintiff-representative] of a 
class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants 
not only of the substantive claims being brought against 
them, but also of the number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.50  
2. The Modern Tolling Approach: Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Parker 
Class action tolling, also known as American Pipe tolling,51 
reached its current form in the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision 
Crown, Cork & Seal Company v. Parker.52 The case arose out of an 
employment discrimination dispute between Theodore Parker 
(Parker) and his former employer Crown, Cork & Seal Company 
(Crown).53 In October 1977, Parker filed a racial discrimination 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).54 The EEOC issued a statement that found no reasonable 
support for Parker’s claim and informed Parker of his right to sue 
Crown under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55 The notice 
to Parker also informed him of a 90-day statute of limitations for the 
action.56 Despite the notice, Parker failed to bring a claim against his 
former employer within the 90-day period.57 
Two months before the EEOC sent notice to Parker of his right 
to sue, two former Crown employees initiated a class action against 
the company for employment discrimination.58 The class described 
in that action, Pendleton v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., included 
Parker and his claim.59 In May 1979, the Pendleton plaintiffs moved 
for class certification, but the motion was denied on Rule 23(a)(1) 
                                                                                                             
 50. See id. at 554–55 (emphasis added) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. 
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)). 
 51. See, e.g., Caleb Brown, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs in on 
Extending American Pipe Tolling in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 793 (2010).  
 52. 462 U.S. 345, 347 (1983).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See id. at 348. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 347.  
 59. Id.  
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numerosity grounds.60 Within 90 days of the denial of class 
certification in Pendleton, but two years after his original notice of 
his right to sue, Parker filed an individual action in federal court.61 
Crown successfully moved for summary judgment, with the district 
court reasoning that Parker “had failed to file his action within 90 
days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, as required by the 
[act].”62 The Fourth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a growing circuit split on whether one 
must intervene in an action after class certification denial to claim 
American Pipe tolling.63  
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, holding that 
“[w]hile American Pipe concerned only intervenors, we conclude 
that the holding of that case is not to be read so narrowly. The filing 
of a class action tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted 
members of the class, not just as to intervenors.”64 The Court 
reasoned that many of the “same inefficiencies” identified in the 
American Pipe decision “would ensue if [the] . . . tolling rule were 
limited to permitting putative class members to intervene after the 
denial of class certification,” as “[a] putative class member who 
fears that class certification may be denied would have every 
incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own 
period of limitations.”65 A failure to extend American Pipe to all 
putative class members would result in the “needless multiplicity of 
actions” that tolling rules were meant to prevent.66 Importantly, the 
Crown majority held that “[o]nce the statute of limitations has been 
tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until 
                                                                                                             
 60. See id. at 347–48.  
 61. Id. at 348.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. American Pipe, read narrowly, allows “all purported members of the 
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 
538, 553 (1974). The Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit held that intervention is a 
necessary prerequisite for class action tolling. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 
618 (9th Cir. 1982); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977). The Fourth 
Circuit held that “the rule in American Pipe is not limited to intervenors but 
applies to all members of the class.” Parker v. Crown, Cork and Seal Co., 677 F.2d 
391, 393 (4th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).  
 64. Crown, 462 U.S. at 350 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 65. Id. at 350–51.  
 66. Id. at 351; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553–54 (“[A] rule requiring [a putative 
plaintiff’s] successful anticipation of the determination of the viability of the class 
would breed needless duplication of motions.”).  
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class certification is denied.”67 Crown’s approach continues to 
govern the question of class action tolling.68 
B. Interlocutory Appeals of Class Certification Decisions and the 
Promulgation of Rule 23(f) 
In the course of a class action, the most crucial pretrial decision 
that a district court makes is whether to certify the purported class—
commentators have described class certification decisions as “the 
whole ball game”69 and “the main event.”70 The consequences for 
victory or defeat on the question of class certification are often 
momentous. For plaintiffs, “denial of certification of a class can 
doom the litigation if the representative plaintiffs’ individual claims 
are insufficient to make individual litigation economically 
feasible.”71 For a defendant, class certification can result in so-called 
blackmail settlements72 because successful class certification “can 
turn a relatively inconsequential case into one with hundreds, even 
thousands, of claimants and carry with it damages upwards of one 
billion dollars.”73 Indeed, the pressure to settle after successful class 
certification can be so great as to cause defendants to “abandon a 
meritorious defense” to avert potential economic catastrophe.74 
Despite the class certification decision’s clear importance, 
interlocutory appeals of such decisions were historically difficult to 
achieve.75 Parties seeking review of a district court’s class 
                                                                                                             
 67. Crown, 462 U.S. at 354. See also infra Part IV.C.2.i.  
 68. See, e.g., Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2011); McClelland v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 431 F. App’x 718, 721 (10th 
Cir. 2011).  
 69. PAUL V. NIEMEYER, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES 21 (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf (comments of Guy Rounsaville, Jr.).  
 70. Id. at 30 (comments of C.C. Torbert, Jr.).  
 71. Christopher A. Kitchen, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action 
Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): A Proposal 
for a New Guideline, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 232 (2004). Such actions 
are known as “negative value” class actions, which arise when a plaintiff’s claim 
is not large enough to justify proceeding individually. See In re Monumental Life 
Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 72. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 18 (comments of John W. Stamper).  
 73. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 232. 
 74. Id.; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978). 
 75. Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class 
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of 
Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2000) (“Until 
recently, parties seeking interlocutory relief [from an adverse class certification 
ruling] have had few options.” (citation omitted)); Kitchen, supra note 71, at 233 
(“Historically, however, there have been few options for parties to appeal a 
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certification decision were routinely left waiting through trial and 
final judgment, often a multiyear process, for an opportunity to 
appeal.76 Though the landscape for interlocutory, postcertification 
denial appeals has changed dramatically, the difficulty of achieving 
such an appeal prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f) was a key 
factor in the judicial analysis of postcertification denial tolling.77 
1. Pre-Rule 23(f) Interlocutory Appeals of Class Certification 
Jurisprudence 
As a general rule, “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts 
of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in 
the Supreme Court.”78 As a means of encouraging “judicial 
efficiency”79 and preventing parties from using delay tactics and 
forcing settlements,80 only final decisions from district courts may 
be appealed.81 Exceptions in the context of interlocutory appeals of 
pre-Rule 23(f) class certification decisions came in three forms: (1) 
the collateral order doctrine, (2) interlocutory appeals under 28 
                                                                                                             
 
certification decision.” (citation omitted)); NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 17 
(comments of Patrick E. Maloney) (“[Prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f), 
there was] no effective means for interlocutory review of class certification 
rulings.”); Carey M. Erhard, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review of Class 
Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L. 
REV. 151, 152 (2002) (“Despite its decisive nature, until recently, class 
certification determinations were essentially unreviewable until the court ruled on 
the merits of the case.”). 
 76. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 
1998) (en banc). 
 77. Id. at 1389. 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).  
 79. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (“Restricting 
appellate review to ‘final decisions’ prevents the debilitating effect on judicial 
administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical 
consequence, but a single controversy.”); see also Erhard, supra note 75, at 152.  
 80. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); see also 
Erhard, supra note 75, at 152–53.  
 81. A final decision or final judgment is “traditionally defined to be a decision 
by the district court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.” See Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 
1547 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 
229, 233 (1945)); see also Erhard, supra note 75, at 152.  
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U.S.C. § 1292(b), and (3) a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a).82 
The collateral order doctrine, first articulated in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,83 provided that an 
interlocutory appeal is available after a class certification decision 
when a party can demonstrate that the certification order “[(1)] 
conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [(2)] resolve[s] an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, 
and [(3)] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”84 The collateral order doctrine’s viability as a means of 
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions did not 
last. A subsequent collateral order doctrine case, Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, effectively prohibited the use of the collateral 
order doctrine for interlocutory appeals of class certification 
decisions.85  
The second method for attaining interlocutory review of pre-
Rule 23(f) class certification decisions came through 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b).86 Notably, § 1292(b) requires “dual certification,” as “[t]he 
                                                                                                             
 82. Erhard, supra note 75, at 153–55; Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 
1552–61. This list does not include the so-called death-knell doctrine, discussed 
infra note 85. 
 83. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See also Erhard, supra note 75, at 153 n.9. 
 84. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citations 
omitted) (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).  
 85. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 154; Kitchen, supra note 71, at 237. 
Coopers v. Lybrand also put an end to the death knell doctrine. Prior to Coopers & 
Lybrand, courts entertained interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions 
where “a denial of class certification effectively ends the litigation because the 
plaintiffs’ individual stakes in the litigation are too small to litigate their individual 
claims.” Erhard, supra note 75, at 153 n.13 (citation omitted). The death knell 
doctrine was fraught with pragmatic application issues, as “courts . . . failed to 
create any precise test when using these factors to determine when an appeal was 
justified.” Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1553 (citation omitted). Indeed, 
determining whether an adverse ruling was a “death knell” to a plaintiff’s claim 
required an “extensive” case-by-case analysis. Id. “Making such a determination 
would often require extensive development of the facts and this raised questions as 
to how much of a record had to be developed at the trial court level for future use.” 
Kitchen, supra note 71, at 238 (citation omitted).  
 86. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 240; Erhard, supra note 75, at 154; Solimine & 
Hines, supra note 75, at 1550. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) dictates that 
[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, 
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which 
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is 
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, 
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decision to certify [the class certification question for appeal] is 
wholly within the discretion of both the district and the appellate 
courts.”87 The dual certification requirement of § 1292(b) creates a 
great challenge for parties seeking interlocutory review of a class 
certification decision because the statute “requires the blessing of 
the very district court that issued the questionable ruling in the first 
place.”88 Even when the district court certifies the question for 
review, the court of appeals retains total discretion for entertaining 
the appeal.89 Courts of appeals may refuse to hear § 1292(b) claims 
even for purely practical reasons.90 As a result of § 1292(b)’s 
double-hurdle, such “appeals . . . in fact provide review in only a 
small fraction of cases.”91  
The final pre-Rule 23(f) approach for attaining interlocutory 
review of class certification decisions is through mandamus under 
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).92 Mandamus “is something of a last resort” for 
interlocutory review because “courts will generally only grant a writ 
of mandamus in extraordinary situations, such as where a district 
judge has clearly exceeded her authority and there is no other route 
to appeal.”93 Mandamus proved to be an ineffective means for 
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions.94 
                                                                                                             
 
That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the 
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge 
thereof shall so order.  
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 87. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551 (emphasis added).  
 88. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).  
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
 90. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551 (“[A] court of appeals can deny 
such an appeal for any reason, including a congested docket.” (citing Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
 91. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick). For 
an extensive analysis of jurisprudential attitudes toward interlocutory review under 
§ 1292(b) in general, see Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals 
in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1165, 1171–74 (1990). 
 92. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551–52; Erhard, supra note 75, at 
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) dictates that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 
 93. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 241 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (“[I]t is 
clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of 
power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 94. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551–52 (“As is stated frequently, 
however, the writ is no substitute for an appeal.” (citations omitted)); NIEMEYER, 
supra note 69, at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg) (“Mandamus is not 
sufficient.”). 
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Indeed, a mere “[three] mandamus petitions . . . reached the merits” 
in the decade prior to Rule 23(f)’s promulgation.95  
2. The Promulgation of Rule 23(f) 
Rule 23(f) was promulgated at a time when interlocutory appeals 
of class certification decisions were rare.96 The Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules’ (Advisory Committee) reform efforts in the late 
1990s did not, however, arise in a vacuum. In 1986, the Section of 
Litigation of the American Bar Association (ABA) first proposed 
that “the Federal Judicial Code be amended to permit immediate 
appeal of class certification decisions, at the discretion of the 
appeals court.”97 The American Law Institute and other legal 
commentators echoed the ABA’s proposal.98 Nevertheless, the 
Advisory Committee’s Rule 23(f), which went into effect on 
December 1, 1998, was the first successful effort to reform the 
interlocutory review process for class certification decisions.99  
Though numerous justifications for Rule 23(f) were given, the 
rule’s supporters tended to identify two primary justifications—the 
general need for appellate review of class certification decisions and 
the concern over district court behavior in an essentially appeal-free 
area.100 Advocates for plaintiffs and defendants repeatedly stressed 
the need for an effective avenue for interlocutory appeal.101 As 
Irving R. Segal stated for the American Association of Trial 
Lawyers, “[g]iven the complexity and dynamics of typical class 
action procedure, appellate review of class certification by a trial 
court is, as a matter of pragmatic fact, a genuine remedy only if the 
                                                                                                             
 95. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick).  
 96. See supra Part I.B.1; see also NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 3–4 
(discussing how Rule 23(f) “responds to widespread observations that it is difficult 
to secure effective appellate review of class certification decisions”).  
 97. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1562 (citing Am. Bar Ass’n Sec. of 
Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action 
Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 210–11 (1986)). 
 98. Id. at 1563. 
 99. Id. at 1564.  
 100. Though class certification could be appealed upon final judgment, class 
certification decisions often encourage either the action’s settlement or its 
abandonment. See infra Part II.B.  
 101. But cf. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 22 (comments of Richard A. 
Koffman) (“Overwhelmingly plaintiffs oppose and defendants support. This is 
clear proof that this proposal favors defendants. That is because it will occasion 
delay. Class actions take long enough now. Mandamus and § 1292(b) are 
protection enough.”); id. at 14 (comments of Stephen Gardner) (“Defendants 
almost always will seek to appeal. Plaintiffs almost never will.”).  
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appeal is taken at or shortly after certification.”102 Similarly, Patrick 
E. Maloney, representing the Defense Research Institute, stated that 
“[a]ll litigants need a method to obtain timely and meaningful 
review of class certification orders” because “[t]he certification 
order often ends the litigation as a practical matter.”103 Discussing 
the benefits of Rule 23(f) for plaintiffs and defendants alike, 
commentator Donn P. Pickett noted that “[i]nterlocutory appeal will 
provide guidance to plaintiffs who fail to win certification, and 
protection to defendants faced with certification of a class with 
potential billion dollar damages.”104  
Support for Rule 23(f) also arose from concern over district 
court behavior when making class certification decisions. Some 
proponents merely hoped to see class certification decisions treated 
more carefully. For example, John L. McGoldrick of Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb urged that “[a] realistic possibility of review . . . may spur 
district courts to take certification decisions more seriously.”105 
Other Rule 23(f) supporters alleged that district courts were using 
the certification process for wholly inappropriate purposes. In the 
May 21, 1997, Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
commentator Miles N. Ruthberg claimed that he could “personally 
confirm that some courts deliberately wield certification power 
precisely in order to pressure settlement—irrespective of whether 
the case could ever be fairly tried as a class action.”106  
However, some were critical of Rule 23(f). The Advisory 
Committee claimed that “[t]he main ground of opposition is that 
applications for permission to appeal will become a routine strategy 
for increasing cost and delay.”107 The Federal Bar Association 
suggested that “[t]he Circuit Courts of Appeals are presently 
inundated with cases . . . [and that] [a]dding an additional class of 
appeals (even permissive appeals) under these circumstances seems 
counterproductive.”108 Nevertheless, Rule 23(f) was successfully 
adopted. 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Irving R. 
Segal).  
 103. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Patrick E. 
Maloney).  
 104. Id. at 22 (comments of Donn P. Pickett).  
 105. Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of John L. 
McGoldrick). But cf. id. at 23 (comments attributed to the Chicago Council of 
Lawyers) (“Indeed, district courts may become less responsible if the locus of 
responsibility [for class certification decisions] is shifted to appellate courts.”).  
 106. Id. at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).  
 107. Id. at 4.  
 108. Id. at 25 (comments attributed to the Federal Bar Association).  
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3. Rule 23(f)’s Text, Commentary, and Development 
Modern Rule 23(f) provides:  
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order 
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule 
if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit 
clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal 
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the 
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.109  
Rule 23(f) was a direct response to the difficulty of attaining 
interlocutory review on the important question of class 
certification.110 The comments to the 1998 amendments to Rule 23 
reflect the belief that class certification review could, through 
appellate discretion, be achieved efficiently and economically.111 
Indeed, the comments to the 1998 amendments suggest that the 
appellate courts have “sole discretion” in choosing which, if any, 
Rule 23(f) appeals to entertain.112 The district court need not “certify 
the certification ruling for appeal, although the district court often 
can assist the parties and court of appeals by offering advice on the 
desirability of appeal.”113 
Although its text has been altered since promulgation, Rule 
23(f)’s substance has remained constant. In 2007, the text was 
altered for purely stylistic reasons.114 The comments to the 2007 
amendment reaffirmed the “unfettered discretion” retained by courts 
of appeals in granting Rule 23(f) appeals.115 In 2009, the period for 
appeal was moved from ten days to fourteen.116  
                                                                                                             
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  
 110. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 4.  
 111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., 
subdiv. (f) (noting that concerns about the de facto unavailability of interlocutory 
review of class certification decisions “can be met at low cost by establishing in 
the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases 
that show appeal-worthy certification issues”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amend. (“The 
language of Rule 23 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil 
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology 
consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”).  
 115. Id. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amends. (“The time 
set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days.”).  
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4. The Application of Rule 23(f)  
Since the rule’s promulgation, federal courts and legal scholars 
have come to numerous conclusions as to when a Rule 23(f) appeal 
should be heard.117 Some circuit courts have shown greater 
willingness to hear Rule 23(f) appeals than others, creating forum-
shopping concerns.118 One of the most notable consequences of 
Rule 23(f)’s promulgation is the increased rate at which circuit 
courts entertain interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions.  
In 2002, Carey M. Erhard performed an extensive empirical 
analysis on circuit court behavior in Rule 23(f) appeals.119 Professor 
Erhard’s data suggest that interlocutory appeals of class certification 
decisions are significantly more likely to be heard due to the 
enactment of Rule 23(f).120 Between Rule 23(f)’s promulgation in 
December of 1998 and July of 2002, a period of roughly three and a 
half years, the circuit courts published a combined 40 Rule 23(f) 
opinions.121 Of the 40 opinions, 33 of them reached the merits of the 
appeal; the other seven opinions were written reasons for denying a 
requested appeal.122 These data do not suggest that circuit courts are 
entertaining over 75% of the appeals requested because the study 
did not track unpublished denials of Rule 23(f) requests.123 The 33 
Rule 23(f) appeals that the circuit courts entertained in a three and a 
half year period signify a nearly twofold increase from the number 
of appeals (18) entertained in the decade before Rule 23(f)’s 
enactment.124 Erhard’s data also suggest that, in the first three years 
after Rule 23(f)’s promulgation, the frequency of published Rule 
23(f) opinions increased every year.125  
                                                                                                             
 117. See generally Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action Certification 
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT 
REV. 27 (2007); Aimeee G. Mackay, Appealability of Class Certification Orders 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Toward a Principled Approach, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 755 (2002); DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.2, at 372 (4th ed. 2008). 
 118. Erhard, supra note 75, at 174.  
 119. Id. at 171–74.  
 120. See id.  
 121. Id. at 173. 
 122. See id. at 184–87 (Table 1). 
 123. See id. at 173 n.210. 
 124. Compare id. at 184 (Table a1), with NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20 
(comments of John L. McGoldrick).  
 125. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 171–72.  
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II. TYING THE KNOT: CLASS ACTION TOLLING AFTER A DISTRICT 
COURT’S DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 
The relationship between class action tolling and the 
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions is not always 
apparent; the pre-Rule 23(f) decisions of American Pipe and Crown 
do not explore the possibility of tolling during interlocutory appeals. 
Moreover, Rule 23 does not expressly contemplate class action 
tolling. Yet, the relationship between the two has received attention 
in jurisprudence and, to a much lesser extent, scholarly literature.126 
The circuit courts have held with practical uniformity that class 
action tolling ceases upon a district court’s denial of class 
certification, irrespective of an interlocutory appeal or an appeal 
following final judgment.127 Only two federal district courts have 
                                                                                                             
 126. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir. 
1995); Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 863 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 
1989); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 519–21 (5th Cir. 
2008); Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Andrews v. Orr, 851 
F.2d 146, 149–50 (6th Cir. 1988); Bobbitt v. Milberg, LLP, No. CV-09-629-TUC-
FRZ, 2010 WL 5345867, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); Monahan v. City of 
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 
2004); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 809, 827 
(E.D. La. 2009); Arivella v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174–
75 (D. Mass. 2009); Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, 660 F.3d 587, 589 n.1 (2d 
Cir. 2011). For examples of scholarly coverage on the issue, see 1 JOSEPH M. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:15 (7th 
ed. 2011); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:38 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012).  
 127. See, e.g., Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1355; Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1013; 
Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390; Taylor, 554 F.3d at 519–21; Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 
1390; Andrews, 851 F.2d at 149–50. But see Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 
689, 696 (7th Cir. 1975) (“In this case we have no doubt that the filing of the 
complaint tolled the statute at least until the date of the three-judge district court 
decision on the merits. If that decision had expressly refused to certify the case as 
a class action, we think the tolling would have continued if the plaintiffs had 
appealed from such a ruling, but probably would not have continued if they had 
acquiesced. Therefore, if the district court’s failure to address the class action issue 
is construed as an adverse ruling, the plaintiffs’ failure to raise that issue on appeal 
to the Supreme Court would defeat the unnamed plaintiffs’ claims.”). Jimenez was 
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Crown and before the 
promulgation of Rule 23(f). The Seventh Circuit’s dicta have not generated 
support, and its decision was treated negatively by the Eleventh Circuit. See 
Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1384.  
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published opinions that partially challenged the appellate courts on 
this issue.128 
A. Bellwether Appellate Opinions on Tolling After Certification 
Denial  
As previously noted, numerous circuit courts have addressed the 
issue of tolling following the denial of class certification.129 
However, two opinions stand out—the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in 
Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,130 and the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corporation.131 Both 
opinions offer more comprehensive analyses of the question than do 
comparable decisions from other circuit courts. The decisions serve 
as bellwethers for other reasons as well. Taylor is the most recent 
published appellate decision on this issue. Armstrong is relevant 
because it was handed down months before Rule 23(f)’s 
promulgation, and the court discussed the manner in which the then 
proposed rule could change the landscape of tolling postcertification 
denial.132  
1. Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.—The “Representation” 
Justification 
On March 19, 2003, Elton Taylor (Taylor) brought suit against 
his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) for employment 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981.133 Prior to his 2003 action, Taylor was a putative plaintiff in 
a class action filed on June 17, 1994, Morgan v. United Parcel 
Service of America, Inc.,134 “alleging race discrimination in 
employment by UPS.”135 The plaintiffs’ claims in Morgan were 
dismissed through summary judgment on June 26, 2000, and the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.136 Taylor’s 
                                                                                                             
 128. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2; Monahan, 2004 
WL 758342, at *2.  
 129. See supra note 126.  
 130. 554 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 131. 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 132. See id. at 1389 n.35.  
 133. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 513–14.  
 134. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 380 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
 135. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 513. 
 136. Id. 
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individual claims under federal law largely matched those in the 
Morgan class action.137 
In April of 2005, UPS moved for summary judgment against 
Taylor.138 The Western District of Louisiana granted the motion in 
part, holding that a number of the statutes of limitations had run for 
the claims originally made on behalf of Taylor in Morgan, including 
the claims under Title VII.139 Specifically, the court rejected 
Taylor’s contention that the Morgan claims’ statutes of limitations 
were tolled between the June 2000 grant of summary judgment and 
the Eighth Circuit’s August 2004 decision affirming the 
dismissal.140  
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Western District of Louisiana on 
tolling, holding that “Taylor’s claims were tolled until August 30, 
2004, when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in 
Morgan.”141 Notably, though, the court drew a sharp distinction 
between tolling after an adverse summary judgment in a class action 
and the outright denial of class certification.142 Indeed, the court 
wrote at length about the impropriety of continued tolling beyond 
certification denial.143  
After discussing American Pipe and Crown, the court held that 
“it is clear from these cases that if the district court denies class 
certification under Rule 23, tolling of the statute of limitations 
ends.”144 For the Fifth Circuit, the central question was one of 
continued representation; discussing the question of representation 
after class certification denial, the court held that  
[i]n those cases [of class certification denial], the district 
court’s refusal to certify the class was tantamount to a 
declaration that only the named plaintiffs were parties to the 
suit. Thus, those cases logically concluded that after the 
                                                                                                             
 137. See id. at 514. Taylor also alleged that UPS had retaliated against him for 
participating in the Morgan action.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 521.  
 142. Id. (“In sum, because the Morgan district court did not deny class 
certification, American Pipe, Crown, Cork & Seal, and Calderon are inapposite. 
Because Taylor remained a member of a certified class while Morgan was on 
appeal, he was entitled to assume that the class representatives continued to 
represent him and protect his interests in appealing the order dismissing the class 
claims on the merits. This is consistent with the general rule that all members of a 
certified class enjoy the same rights as individually named plaintiffs in the suit.”).  
 143. Id. at 517–21.  
 144. Id. at 519. The court also cited Calderon for the same proposition. See id. 
(“Calderon therefore establishes that the denial of certification ends the tolling 
period without regard to any appeal from that decision.”). 
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district court’s denial of certification, the putative class 
members had no reason to assume that their rights were 
being protected. Stated differently, they were notified that 
they were no longer parties to the suit and they should have 
realized that they were obliged to file individual suits or 
intervene in the class action.145 
The court came to the opposite conclusion for tolling after an initial 
grant of summary judgment in a class action, holding that 
[class members facing adverse summary judgment are] 
entitled to assume that the class representatives continued to 
represent [them] and protect [their] interests in appealing the 
order dismissing the class claims on the merits. This is 
consistent with the general rule that all members of a 
certified class enjoy the same rights as individually named 
plaintiffs in the suit.146 
Two district courts have echoed the conclusion that putative class 
members are not entitled to rely on the named plaintiffs following 
class certification denial.147  
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was predicated on the class 
action’s special, representative nature.148 A district court’s denial of 
class certification is especially significant because the putative 
plaintiffs “were notified that they were no longer parties to the 
suit.”149 The court placed the onus to act on the putative plaintiff 
because she “should have realized that [she was] obliged to file [an] 
individual suit[] or intervene in the class action;” it was no longer 
reasonable for a putative plaintiff to rely on the named plaintiff in 
the action.150 The Fifth Circuit did not address Rule 23(f) 
specifically151 and did not consider a putative plaintiff’s reliance on 
an appeal well founded in general.152 Moreover, the determinative 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).  
 146. Id. at 521.  
 147. See Bobbitt v. Milberg, LLP, No. CV-09-629-TUC-FRZ, 2010 WL 
5345867, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. 
Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 809, 827 (E.D. La. 2009). 
 148. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. (citing Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 
1983) (suggesting that it is reasonable for a putative plaintiff to rely on the named 
plaintiff after an adverse ruling on the merits but not after an adverse class 
certification decision)).  
 151. As did the Eleventh Circuit in Armstrong. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 152. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520 (“Calderon therefore establishes that the 
denial of certification ends the tolling period without regard to any appeal from 
that decision.”).  
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factor for disallowing tolling after certification denial is the district 
court’s “declaration” that the named plaintiff only represents 
herself.153  
2. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp.—The Pre-Rule 23(f) 
“Pragmatic” Justification 
Armstrong arose from a class action filed pursuant to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act154 by former Martin Marietta 
employees.155 As in Crown,156 the plaintiffs attained the right to sue 
upon the receipt of notice from the EEOC; the relevant statute of 
limitations began to run against the plaintiffs upon receipt of the 
notice of their right to sue.157 On June 4, 1993, nearly every 
Armstrong plaintiff opted in to an already-filed class action against 
Martin Marietta158 called Carmichael v. Martin Marietta 
Corporation.159 On April 7, 1994, the Middle District of Florida 
held that the Armstrong plaintiffs “were not similarly situated to the 
other Carmichael plaintiffs” and excluded them from the class.160 
On October 11, 1994, “more than ninety days after the Carmichael 
court’s partial denial of class certification,” the plaintiffs in 
Armstrong filed their own class action against their former 
employer.161 In its successful motion for summary judgment, Martin 
Marietta claimed that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred 
because more than 90 days had elapsed since the plaintiffs were 
excluded from the Carmichael class.162  
In the last major appellate opinion on the issue prior to the 
promulgation of Rule 23(f), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.163 After 
assessing the cases of American Pipe and Crown, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,164 
                                                                                                             
 153. See id. 
 154. 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 155. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 
1998) (en banc). 
 156. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 347 (1983).  
 157. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1378–79. 
 158. The plaintiffs had to “opt in” because of the complications arising from 
requiring an EEOC right-to-sue confirmation. See id. at 1392. 
 159. Id. at 1379. 
 160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1379–80. 
 163. Id. at 1394. 
 164. 432 U.S. 385 (1977). This case dealt with a putative plaintiff who had 
intervened following class certification denial and a settlement between the named 
plaintiff and United Airlines for the sole purpose of challenging the class 
certification decision. Id. at 392. The court held that the intervention was proper 
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and expressing doubt that the Supreme Court intended tolling to 
continue beyond a district court’s denial of class certification,165 the 
court rested its conclusion largely on “practical considerations.”166  
The court first discussed the great difficulty of attaining 
interlocutory review of class certification decisions.167 Noting that 
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions are “relatively 
uncommon and are very rarely successful,” the court held that a 
putative plaintiff’s “reliance on the possibility of reversal [of an 
adverse class certification decision] upon an interlocutory appeal is 
unreasonable.”168 Disputing an argument made by a dissenting 
judge, the court explained that extending class action tolling through 
the appeals process “would often toll the statute of limitations 
through a final judgment [and complex, multi-issue appeals], a 
process that can take years[,] on the off chance that a few filings will 
be saved by the slim prospect of a successful appeal.”169 The 
Armstrong court also held that a tolling extension through the 
appeals process is incompatible with the litigation strategies used in 
modern class actions.170 For example, the court found the extension 
of tolling beyond the denial of class certification irreconcilable with 
the oft-used plaintiff strategy of settling claims quickly after an 
adverse ruling on class certification.171 Next, the court noted the 
difficulty of determining when tolling would cease: 
When, [after class certification is denied], does the statute of 
limitations resume running? When the stipulation of 
dismissal or the final judgment is entered? After appeal by 
the named plaintiffs (who now have little incentive to pursue 
                                                                                                             
 
because the motion was made within the “time limitation for lodging an appeal” 
following a final judgment. Id. at 392–95. Further, the defendants were on notice 
for the appeal because the named plaintiffs had requested interlocutory relief 
before settling. Id. at 393–94.  
 165. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1380–84.  
 166. See id. at 1385–91.  
 167. Id. See also supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 168. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1389 (footnote omitted).  
 169. Id. at 1389–90 (footnote omitted). In a different portion of the opinion, the 
court stated that such multiyear tolling during the appeals process “contravene[s] 
the policies underlying statutes of limitations” because “[s]tatutes of limitations 
are intended to prevent the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared.” Id. at 1388 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express 
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 170. See id. at 1390.  
 171. See id. There is wisdom in this position because it follows that a putative 
plaintiff cannot reasonably rely on a former named plaintiff that has dismissed his 
or her claims against the defendant.  
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years of appeals)? And what if disappointed putative class 
members seek to intervene, as in United Airlines, for the 
purpose of appeal? Should they be given the benefit of years 
of continued tolling, despite the fact that their chances for 
success on appeal are terribly slim? This is not idle nit-
picking.172 
The court reasoned that ending tolling when the circuit court denied 
certification struck a reasonable balance between the rights of 
plaintiffs and defendants: 
The earlier the event that triggers the resumption of the 
limitations period—say, the joint stipulation of dismissal—
the greater the potential for prejudicial surprise of excluded 
putative class members. The later that event—say, the final 
failure of an appeal by intervening putative class members—
the greater the potential that cases will grow stale.173 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the notion that putative 
plaintiffs were bereft of protection following an adverse class 
certification ruling:  
The appellants argue that the rule we adopt will force 
disappointed putative class members to choose between 1) 
filing an individual lawsuit within the statute of limitations 
period or 2) exercising their right to appeal the denial of 
class certification. This does not have to be the case. A 
putative class member who wishes to preserve both rights 
should file her individual suit and immediately seek a stay of 
the individual suit pending the outcome of an appeal from 
the denial of class certification. If, in the judgment of the 
district (or state) court to whom the application for a stay 
has been made, the plaintiff’s hopes for reversal of the initial 
denial of class certification are strong, and if the delay 
caused by the stay will not be too great, the court may, in its 
discretion, grant the stay; if the court believes that the 
chances of reversal are slim or the delay caused by waiting 
for the appellate process to conclude will be too long (as will 
usually be the case), the stay will properly be denied, and the 
plaintiff will properly have to proceed individually. This is a 
just, efficient result.174 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 174. Id. at 1391 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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At the time the case was decided, Rule 23(f) had been proposed 
but not adopted.175 The court noted that the rule had the potential to 
alter substantively its pragmatic calculus. Specifically, the court 
posited: 
If the rule passes, and if it significantly increases the 
frequency of interlocutory appeals of class certification 
orders—a development which would depend in large part 
upon how this court chooses to exercise the discretion 
granted to it by the proposed rule—then we may revisit the 
decision taken today, and might for instance allow continued 
tolling of statutes of limitations during the pendency of an 
appeal under the new rule.176 
The majority expressly refused to “speculate . . . how we might 
exercise our discretion under the proposed rule and to decide the 
instant case in reliance upon an as-yet un-enacted rule.”177 The court 
also suggested that a stay of proceedings did not have the effect of 
restarting tolling, irrespective of Rule 23(f)’s enactment.178 Other 
courts have come to the opposite conclusion on a stay’s tolling 
effect.179 Whether stays have the effect of recommencing tolling 
remains an open question.180 
B. Dissenting Voices  
The Armstrong court conceded that Rule 23(f) had the potential 
to affect, if not reverse, the rule that tolling ceases upon class 
certification denial.181 Despite the rule’s successful promulgation, 
however, circuit courts of appeals have not wavered from the pre-
                                                                                                             
 175. See id. at 1389 n.35.  
 176. Id. (emphasis added).  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. (“In the absence of guidance, we do not hold that a stay of a district 
court’s order denying certification would toll the limitations period, either under 
the proposed rule or under the law controlling our decision today.”).  
 179. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000) (“A stay in the matter 
of National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. tolling the 
statute of limitations period pending the outcome of an interlocutory appeal is 
granted.”); Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 
758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004) (“Accordingly, the Court concludes that its 
stay of the proceedings pending appeal of the denial of class certification 
continued the tolling of the statute of limitations for the proposed plaintiffs’ 
claims.”).  
 180. Stays in this context are discussed infra Part II.B. 
 181. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1389 n.35.  
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Rule 23(f) Armstrong rule.182 Two district courts have, however, 
questioned the reasoning of cases like Taylor and Armstrong. 
1. National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, 
Inc.  
On September 26, 2000, the Eastern District of New York issued 
an order that directly discussed the Eleventh Circuit’s Armstrong 
opinion and, more generally, the wisdom of ceasing tolling upon a 
district court’s denial of class certification.183 The September 26 
order came on the heels of a class certification denial.184 The named 
plaintiff appealed the decision under Rule 23(f).185 The order was 
granted due to concerns “about the effect of [then two-year old Rule 
23(f) on] the running of the statute of limitations pending [an 
interlocutory] appeal.”186  
The court issued a stay of proceedings to toll the relevant statute 
of limitations, holding that “a limited stay is justified” as a means of 
ensuring “that members of the class and defendants as well as the 
courts are not unnecessarily burdened by individual suits to protect 
statute of limitations tolling rights prior to the appellate decision.”187 
In granting the stay, the court recognized that “[p]rior to the 
December 1998 enactment of Rule 23(f), courts followed a 
reasonableness standard in determining when the statute of 
limitations would start to run in a class action,” and “[t]olling ended 
when it was no longer reasonable for the putative class members to 
rely” on the named plaintiffs.188 Nonetheless, the reasonability of a 
putative plaintiff’s reliance on the named plaintiff was affected by 
Rule 23(f)’s promulgation, which “signaled a new regime allowing 
putative class members to more easily obtain interlocutory appeals 
on the issue of class certification.”189 Thus, the court reasoned that 
“[t]he policies undergirding the adoption of Rule 23(f) suggest . . . 
                                                                                                             
 182. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 521 (5th Cir. 
2008). One post-Rule 23(f) case acknowledged that Armstrong may be obsolete; 
however, the court declined to discuss Rule 23(f)’s effects on tolling because the 
rule is not allowed in actions in the Court of International Trade. Stone Container 
Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 183. Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1.  
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at *2.  
 186. See id. at *1.  
 187. Id. (citations omitted). The court qualified its “justification” for the stay 
by recognizing the lack of post-Rule 23(f) appellate jurisprudence. See id. (“[A] 
limited stay is justified—at least pending clarification of Rule 23(f) practice.”).  
 188. Id. (citing Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 
 189. See id.  
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that the statute of limitations should be tolled where a party files an 
interlocutory appeal and the district court grants a stay.”190 
The court justified its limited tolling extension through a stay on 
two grounds.191 First, the court noted that a Rule 23(f) appeal could 
result in the “prompt revival of the class action.”192 Because of the 
potential for a rapid reversal of a district court’s certification 
decision, a toll-inducing stay should be rendered by a district court 
when a Rule 23(f) appeal is made to encourage putative plaintiffs to 
continue to rely on the named plaintiff’s action.193 Second, the court 
held that equity supports a stay because the harm a defendant would 
suffer waiting through an “expedited appeals process” is far less 
than the harm a putative plaintiff would face if her claim became 
time-barred in the period between a denial of class certification and 
a Rule 23(f) ruling.194 It is worth noting that this district court never 
directly questioned the viability of Armstrong post-Rule 23(f). 
Instead, the court held that tolling should continue only where a 
Rule 23(f) appeal is perfected and a stay is entered by the district 
court.195 
2. Monahan v. City of Wilmington  
On May 19, 2000, numerous members of the Wilmington Police 
Department filed a class action against their employer alleging 
violations of federal law.196 On July 31, 2001, the District of 
Delaware denied class certification.197 The plaintiffs successfully 
obtained a stay from the district court and appealed under Rule 
23(f).198 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District of 
Delaware’s decision on March 28, 2003.199 After the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. (emphasis added).  
 191. The tolling extension is limited insofar as tolling continues if a Rule 23(f) 
appeal is actually filed and if the district court grants a stay. See id. 
 192. Id. at *2.  
 193. See id. The court’s argument is in line with the American Pipe Court’s 
goal of fostering reliance by unnamed class members on the named plaintiff. See 
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550–53 (1974). 
 194. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2. A ruling on a Rule 
23(f) appeal could come in the form of a decision on the merits of the district 
court’s certification decision or in the form of a denial to entertain the appeal 
whatsoever. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  
 195. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1.  
 196. Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 
758342, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004). Plaintiffs stated claims under, inter alia, 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 
 197. Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *1.  
 198. Id. at *1–2. 
 199. Id. at *1.  
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brought a second action against the city, the Wilmington Police 
Department claimed that the district court’s 2001 denial of class 
certification ceased the tolling of the relevant statutes of limitations, 
resulting in time-barred claims.200 
The District of Delaware, like the Eastern District of New York, 
held that tolling continues after class certification denial as long as a 
plaintiff takes a Rule 23(f) appeal and obtains a stay.201 The court 
recognized the pre-Rule 23(f) jurisprudence202 but decided to follow 
the National Asbestos Workers decision.203 Noting the permissive 
nature of Rule 23(f) and its purpose of promoting rapid review of 
district court certification decisions, the court reasoned that the 
danger of a lengthy, prejudicial tolling period was greatly 
reduced.204 Thus, the court reasoned that “Rule 23(f) provides a 
reasonable basis for putative class plaintiffs to continue to rely upon 
a filed class action to redress their individual claims pending an 
appeal of a denial of class certification.”205  
III. CHALLENGING THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Appellate Courts’ Denial of Tolling After Certification 
Denial 
1. The “Representative” Justification of Taylor v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc. 
In holding that a denial of class certification is “tantamount to a 
declaration that only the named plaintiffs were parties to the suit” 
and that putative plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on named 
plaintiffs after a district court’s class certification decision,206 the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
perpetuates the possibility of a Calderon-like ejection from an 
action, ignores American Pipe’s policy goals, and creates an 
unnecessary Catch-22 for plaintiffs after a class certification denial. 
                                                                                                             
 200. Id. at *2. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The court specifically recognized Nelson v. Allegheny County, 60 F.3d 
1010 (3d Cir. 1995), and Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 138 F.3d 
1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *2. 
 203. Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 
 204. See id.  
 205. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip 
Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 
2000)). 
 206. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520–21 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
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Moreover, the Taylor court completely fails to address Rule 23(f)’s 
stated purposes. Indeed, the result of the Fifth Circuit’s approach 
undermines the fundamental goals of Rule 23 while prejudicing 
putative plaintiffs.  
Perhaps the central purpose of American Pipe tolling is the 
encouragement of reliance on the named plaintiffs in an action; 
without putative plaintiff reliance through tolling, Rule 23 would be 
deprived of “the efficiency and economy of litigation” that its 
drafters and Congress intended.207 Yet the Fifth Circuit’s Taylor 
holding that a putative plaintiff may not rely on a named plaintiff 
after an adverse certification ruling encourages litigants to act 
inefficiently. Under the Taylor approach, a putative plaintiff risks 
being time barred if she simply decides to rely on the named 
plaintiff to appeal an adverse certification ruling—the ultimate 
inability of the plaintiffs to pursue their claims in Calderon v. 
Presidio Valley Farmers Association confirms the danger of such 
reliance. To mitigate the risk of losing litigious rights while 
monitoring the appeals process, a putative plaintiff has a strong 
incentive to file an independent action as soon as class certification 
is denied.208 Such independent actions could be abandoned en masse 
when a subsequent decision overturns the initial class certification 
decision.209 Indeed, this type of protective filing represents the exact 
behavior that class action tolling was meant to end.210 As such, the 
Fifth Circuit’s policy of ending tolling upon class certification denial 
creates an inexorable problem—either plaintiffs must endure the 
running of statutes of limitations and perhaps lose their claims, or 
they must flood the courts with “placeholder” actions in 
contravention of the policies underlying American Pipe and Rule 
23.211 Neither result is acceptable.  
                                                                                                             
 207. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). 
 208. Indeed, this appears to be the Eleventh Circuit’s recommendation. See 
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc). In a large action, this strategy could result in thousands of individual 
actions. The Taylor court made no effort to reconcile this strategy’s consequences 
with the Supreme Court’s desire to reduce redundant actions. See Am. Pipe, 414 
U.S. at 550. The Eleventh Circuit, discussing the issue in a pre-Rule 23(f) context, 
held that the rule would result in some “unnecessarily costly litigation,” but tolling 
through final judgment was an unacceptable means of avoiding such a result. See 
Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388. After Rule 23(f), the need for tolling through final 
judgment no longer exists. See infra Part III.A.2.  
 209. Including, but not limited to, a Rule 23(f) appeal.  
 210. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (noting that the class action is “a truly 
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of 
repetitious papers and motions”); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 
345, 350–51 (1983).  
 211. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550.  
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More fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit’s position that the denial 
of class certification serves as a declaration212 that only the named 
plaintiff remains a party to the action fails to recognize the Advisory 
Committee’s goals in promulgating Rule 23(f). In part, Rule 23(f) 
was created to achieve early resolution of class certification 
questions in a convenient manner for litigants and the courts.213 
Despite the Advisory Committee’s intention, the Fifth Circuit treats 
an initial denial of class certification as a declaration that putative 
plaintiffs are “obliged to file individual suits or intervene in the class 
action.”214 By adopting this position, the Fifth Circuit does more 
than incentivize redundant actions; the court’s policy encourages 
putative plaintiffs to retain counsel, surely at some cost, simply to 
file placeholder actions. The class as a whole may expend large 
sums of money on what may be wholly unnecessary, independent 
actions simply to avoid a looming time-bar (to say nothing of the 
additional administrative costs that the district courts will endure in 
processing the additional claims). This result is prejudicial and 
unjustifiable.  
2. The “Pragmatic” Justification of Armstrong v. Martin 
Marietta Corporation Post-Rule 23(f). 
When the Eleventh Circuit decided Armstrong v. Martin 
Marietta Corporation in 1998, the court recognized that Rule 23(f)’s 
enactment could allow for continued tolling through an interlocutory 
appeal of class certification.215 Considering the Armstrong court’s 
recognition of the potentially transformative nature of Rule 23(f), 
the silence among circuit courts on the issue post-Armstrong has 
                                                                                                             
 212. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Because this case is a bellwether, this Comment has largely avoided discussions of 
external, Fifth-Circuit-specific decisions that relate in less-than-direct ways to the 
instant question. However, it is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly 
held that actual judicial notice of class certification denial is inappropriate. See 
Pearson v. Ecological Sci. Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1975); Jones v. 
Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 937 n.16 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit’s 
holdings in Taylor, Pearson, and Jones place putative plaintiffs in an especially 
difficult position because certification denials serve as a “declaration” that they are 
no longer parties, yet this declaration must not be rendered through actual notice. 
There is serious incongruity in the notion that putative plaintiffs are somehow put 
on notice that they are not parties to an action when class certification is denied, 
yet no actual notice is to be given. The Taylor court made no effort to reconcile 
these contradictory rulings.  
 213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., 
subdiv. (f). 
 214. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520. 
 215. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
1212 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
been alarming. The Eleventh Circuit has yet to revisit the question 
of tolling through a Rule 23(f) appeal, and neither of the two circuit 
courts that have examined the question since 1998 has considered 
the issue.216 Now, 13 years after Rule 23(f)’s enactment, a serious 
reevaluation of Armstrong’s logic is needed.  
In a pre-Rule 23(f) context, Armstrong’s pragmatic reasoning is 
sound. Because of the de facto absence of interlocutory review217 
and the practice of appealing class certification decisions after final 
judgment,218 extending tolling though a final ruling on class 
certification would often grant a putative plaintiff years of tolling. 
Thus, putative plaintiffs could prejudice defendants by reviving 
“claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”219 
Though the Armstrong court’s suggested mechanism for protecting 
putative plaintiffs could result in some “unnecessarily costly 
litigation,”220 the balance struck between protecting plaintiffs and 
defendants was reasonable.  
Armstrong’s pragmatic reasoning, though persuasive at the time, 
is now antiquated. Rule 23(f) was promulgated because of the legal 
and practical difficulties inherent in waiting until final judgment to 
appeal class certification decisions.221 Rule 23(f) was intended to 
afford litigants “timely and meaningful review of class certification 
orders.”222 To protect parties from untimely interlocutory attempts 
to revisit class certification, Rule 23(f) allows only 14 days to 
appeal, and circuit courts are expected to “act quickly in making the 
preliminary determination whether to permit appeal.”223 It is safe to 
say, as a predicate matter, that Rule 23(f) significantly changed the 
postcertification denial appellate landscape.  
The Armstrong court was not, however, willing to accept that 
Rule 23(f) would change its analysis on its face; the court’s 
                                                                                                             
 216. See Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000); Taylor, 554 F.3d at 519–21. The Stone Container court was, to its 
credit, presiding over an action in the Court of International Trade, where Rule 
23(f) is inapplicable. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1355.  
 217. See supra Part I.B.2; Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1385–88. 
 218. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388 (citing Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. 
Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the 
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 170 (1996)).  
 219. Id. (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 
342, 348–49 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 220. Id.  
 221. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 16 (comments of Irving R. Segal); id. at 17 
(comments of Patrick E. Maloney). 
 222. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Patrick E. 
Maloney). 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., subdiv. (f). 
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concession was predicated on an actual increase in the number of 
interlocutory appeals that the circuit courts entertained.224 Based on 
available data, this condition has been met. As the Erhard study on 
Rule 23(f) has shown, circuit courts are entertaining interlocutory 
appeals of class certification decisions at a far greater rate.225 The 
number of Rule 23(f) appeals that the circuit courts heard in the 
three and a half years after the rule’s promulgation is roughly 
double the combined amount of interlocutory appeals and 
mandamus petitions entertained in the decade prior to Rule 23(f)’s 
enactment.226 The data also suggest that the frequency of published 
Rule 23(f) opinions increased every year for the first three years 
after Rule 23(f)’s promulgation.227 The dramatic increase in 
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions, coupled with 
Rule 23(f)’s goals of encouraging and expediting interlocutory 
appeals, suggests that the need to continue tolling until final 
judgment to finalize class certification questions, as posited in 
Armstrong, is simply an artifact of the pre-1998 appellate 
landscape.228 
3. Appellate Asymmetry 
Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2 of this Comment discuss particular 
issues present in the “representative” and “pragmatic” theories of 
postcertification denial tolling, respectively. However, as recent 
jurisprudence shows, an overarching flaw remains in the cases 
advancing the general rule that tolling ceases upon the denial of 
class certification. One of the most important recent decisions in 
Rule 23 jurisprudence came in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.229 
Wal-Mart involved a class action brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that purported to represent 1.5 million 
plaintiffs.230 The Northern District of California certified the 
class,231 and a divided en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
                                                                                                             
 224. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir. 
1998) (en banc). 
 225. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 184–87 (Table 1); see also supra Part I.B.4. 
 226. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 184–87 (Table 1); NIEMEYER, supra note 
69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick); see also supra Part I.B.4. 
 227. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 171–72.  
 228. The Armstrong court’s discussion of the uncertainty that can result from 
extending tolling beyond the denial of class certification is discussed infra Part 
II.A.2.  
 229. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 230. Id. at 2547.  
 231. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (N.D. Cal 2004), 
aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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after Wal-Mart took a Rule 23(f) appeal.232 The Supreme Court 
reversed, denying class certification.233 
The substance of the Supreme Court’s decision is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, Wal-Mart demonstrates the 
arbitrary consequence that flows from the Taylor–Armstrong 
cessation of tolling after certification denial. Under Taylor, for 
example, reliance on the named plaintiff is proper unless the district 
court denies certification.234 Applying the Taylor rule in Wal-Mart, 
tolling continued for all putative plaintiffs through (1) the successful 
motion for class certification filed with the district court, (2) a Rule 
23(f) appeal and hearing at the Ninth Circuit, (3) an en banc 
rehearing, (4) a certiorari petition, and (5) ultimate defeat at the 
United States Supreme Court, simply because of the initial ruling on 
class certification. Yet if the certification decisions in Wal-Mart 
were reversed—i.e., class certification was repeatedly denied until 
the Supreme Court granted certification—then putative plaintiffs 
would have been forced to file individual actions at untold cost, seek 
a discretionary stay,235 or both simply to avoid the running of the 
relevant statute of limitations.236 The current model forces putative 
plaintiffs to expend additional resources simply to monitor the Rule 
23(f) proceedings237 and injects uncertainty into the proceedings due 
to the district court’s initial denial of certification.238 
B. The Inadequacy of District Court Efforts to Protect Plaintiffs 
Recognizing the potential prejudice to plaintiffs that can result 
when tolling does not continue through a Rule 23(f) appeal, two 
district courts have suggested extending tolling through the 
pendency of Rule 23(f) appeals when (1) a Rule 23(f) appeal is 
sought and (2) a stay is attained.239 These courts have extended 
                                                                                                             
 232. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 233. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57.  
 234. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 235. Or, perhaps, stays. Under the National Asbestos Workers model, 
discussed in Part II.B, there is no clear jurisprudential answer on whether a 
plaintiff would need to acquire another stay after defeat at the appellate level 
simply to extend the toll.  
 236. See infra Part III.B.  
 237. Via the need to file independent actions to ensure continued tolling after 
certification denial.  
 238. See infra Part III.B.  
 239. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Monahan v. City of 
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 
2004). Of course, not all courts agree that a stay can toll statutes of limitations. See 
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greater protections to putative plaintiffs than those afforded by, for 
example, the Fifth Circuit. However, the National Asbestos 
Workers–Monahan approach for tolling after certification denial 
contains numerous flaws. Specifically, the solution depends on a 
“merciful” district court, undermines the class action’s efficiency, 
and fails to address the complexities of class action strategy.  
One of the primary defects of the National Asbestos Workers–
Monahan approach is the reintroduction of a de facto dual 
certification requirement. One of the central problems present in the 
pre-Rule 23(f) appellate landscape, specifically under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), was the need for the very district court that denied class 
certification to certify the same question for appeal.240 As supporters 
of the promulgation of Rule 23(f) noted,241 the need for the district 
court to recognize a “close call” to attain an appeal requires a 
plaintiff to acquire the “blessing of the very district court that issued 
the questionable ruling in the first place.”242 Yet, the same dynamic 
is present under the National Asbestos Workers–Monahan 
formulation because plaintiffs must acquire the toll-extending stay 
from the very district court that has denied class certification.243 In 
districts that are typically hostile to class certification, putative 
plaintiffs near the end of the relevant statute of limitations may 
seriously risk a time-bar even if a Rule 23(f) appeal is successfully 
undertaken because the likelihood of a stay could be very low. 
Further, considering a district court judge’s usual aversion to 
reversal,244 she may have an incentive to deny the stay, to allow a 
limitations period to run, and to moot the question of class 
certification entirely.  
Indeed, the need to successfully acquire a stay creates the same 
problem observed in Taylor: the inherent uncertainty involved in a 
Rule 23(f) appeal and a stay, both of which are out of a putative 
plaintiff’s control, undermines Rule 23’s goals of efficiency and 
                                                                                                             
 
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc). There is very little jurisprudence in this area, though district courts 
following National Asbestos Workers and Monahan could create to greater clarity 
on the issue. No circuit court reviewed the National Asbestos Workers or 
Monahan decisions on tolling.  
 240. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551. 
 241. Which dispensed with the need for district court certification for appeal. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., subdiv. (f).  
 242. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).  
 243. Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1. 
 244. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-
Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 78 n.275 
(1994).  
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economy in litigation.245 A putative plaintiff near the end of the 
limitations period must consider (1) if and when the named plaintiff 
will attempt a Rule 23(f) appeal and (2) whether the district court 
will issue a stay.246 The only way to guarantee continued tolling is to 
file an independent action in contravention of the policy goals 
underlying Rule 23.247 To the extent that this uncertainty “breed[s 
the] needless duplication of motions,” this effect is unacceptable.248 
Finally, the National Asbestos Workers–Monahan approach fails 
to respond to the complexities of class-action litigation strategies. 
For example, what happens under this model when the named 
plaintiff chooses to settle upon an adverse class certification ruling? 
This common practice249 would wholly deprive putative plaintiffs of 
a continued tolling benefit because the National Asbestos Workers–
Monahan theory mandates an attempted appeal.250 Despite the 
recognition of a new, liberalized nature of appeals under Rule 
23(f),251 tolling would often begin upon a district court’s denial of 
class certification.  
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
A. A New Way Forward 
The current jurisprudence has simultaneously failed to protect 
defendants and putative plaintiffs equally while advancing the 
policies of efficiency and economy of litigation set forth in 
American Pipe. A new approach should be implemented. Tolling 
beyond class certification denial should be tied to Rule 23(f)’s basic 
structure, allowing for a clean, consistent analysis and an 
evenhanded result. 
After a denial of class certification, tolling should extend 
through the full 14-day period allowed by Rule 23(f) for an 
interlocutory appeal. The toll should continue irrespective of the 
named plaintiff’s behavior.252 If the circuit court refuses to entertain 
                                                                                                             
 245. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Crown, 
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1983).  
 246. To wit, plaintiffs within the Eleventh Circuit need to worry about whether 
a stay will toll the statute of limitations at all. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 247. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; Crown, 462 U.S. at 350–51.  
 248. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553–54.  
 249. See Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390. 
 250. Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000). 
 251. See id.; Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 
WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004). 
 252. That is, settling or electing to proceed individually.  
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an interlocutory appeal or the named plaintiff settles253 or elects to 
proceed individually without appealing the certification, tolling 
should, nevertheless, cease after the 14th day. If the circuit court 
elects to entertain the appeal, tolling should continue until final 
resolution,254 including writs of certiorari and decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. This approach advances the policies 
of Rule 23 identified in American Pipe and eliminates many 
shortcomings produced under the current jurisprudence without 
prejudicing defendants.  
This proposal is based in part on Louisiana’s Code of Civil 
Procedure article 596. The Louisiana approach to tolling beyond 
class certification denial is unique; it diverges from any tolling 
model used by the federal courts or by other state courts. Indeed, 
states have largely adopted the rule that a trial court’s denial of class 
certification ends a class action’s tolling.255 In a noteworthy 
                                                                                                             
 253. In discussing situations wherein a named plaintiff settles yet the action 
continues in some manner, it is important to address potential “case and 
controversy” complications. Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
“Cases” and “Controversies.” See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). Arguably, if every named 
plaintiff in an action settles after class certification is denied, no case or 
controversy would remain. As a result, constitutional issues could arise in granting 
continued tolling to putative plaintiffs—such plaintiffs would retain a tolling 
benefit from an action without a present, named plaintiff. This argument lacks 
merit. The Supreme Court’s decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
discussed supra note 164, held that a putative class member could intervene in an 
action for the purpose of appealing a denial of class certification, even after all 
named plaintiffs have settled. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 
385, 392 (1977). This case confirms that settlement by all named plaintiffs does 
not end an action for case and controversy purposes because the intervention by a 
putative plaintiff after settlement by the named plaintiff depends, implicitly, on the 
fact that there was still a case in which to intervene. 
 254. Final in this context could include nonappealed decisions by a court of 
appeals, nonappealed decisions by a court of appeals sitting en banc, a denied writ 
of certiorari, and a decision made by the United States Supreme Court.  
 255. See, e.g., White v. Sims, 470 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Ala. 1985) (Alabama); 
Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 883 P.2d 522, 532 (Colo. App. 1994) 
(Colorado); Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 254 P.3d 360, 362 (Ariz. 2011) 
(en banc) (The Arizona Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding” that tolling 
ceases upon certification denial by a trial court.); Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
762 A.2d 955, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1999) (New Jersey); Walker v. 
Polyscience Corp., No. C14-89-00678-CV, 1990 WL 79838, at *2 (Tex. App. 
June 14, 1990) (Texas); Hill v. City of Warren, 740 N.W.2d 706, 718 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2007) (Michigan); Columbia Gorge Audubon Society v. Klickitat Cnty., 989 
P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (Washington); Sproul v. Oakland Raiders, 
Nos. A104542, A106658, 2005 WL 1941388, at *21 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 
2005) (California).  
  The Supreme Court of Alaska recognized some of the efficiency concerns 
discussed in this Comment and held that tolling could continue (1) where class 
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departure from the federal and typical state approaches, article 
596(A)(3) extends tolling for a full 30 days after a “mailing or other 
delivery or publication of a notice to the class” of, inter alia, 
dismissal by the named plaintiff, a denial of a motion for 
certification, or an appeal that vacates a previous certification.256 
The 30-day period begins after the time allowed for an appeal has 
passed or when an appeal becomes “final and definitive.”257 Thus, it 
is impossible for a claim to prescribe in the period between a district 
court’s denial of class certification and an appellate court’s reversal 
on the question. This Comment’s proposal is significantly narrower 
than the Louisiana approach. First, the automatic tolling period is 
much shorter.258 Second, this Comment’s proposal does not require 
notice to putative plaintiffs of an adverse class certification ruling.259 
Third, automatic tolling is not “stacked” on top of the period for 
appeal; rather, automatic tolling ends with the passage of Rule 
23(f)’s window for appeal.260  
B. A Proposal in Jurisprudential Action  
The automatic extension of tolling through Rule 23(f)’s 14-day 
period rectifies the inefficiencies that the Taylor and National 
                                                                                                             
 
certification had been denied and (2) the denying court expressly has authorized 
further discovery and another opportunity to seek class certification. Fred Meyer 
of Alaska, Inc. v. Adams, 963 P.2d 1025, 1028–29 (Alaska 1998). Notably, the 
Fred Meyer decision did not involve an interlocutory appeal, and it is unclear 
whether the Alaska Supreme Court would apply the reasoning in a case where 
class certification had been definitively denied.  
  The Ohio General Assembly has adopted a savings statute that extends an 
action’s statute of limitations for one year when a plaintiff’s action fails without 
consideration on the merits. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (Westlaw 
2013). This savings period applies in the case of class certification denial. See 
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160, 171 (Ohio 2002). 
Ohio’s omnibus savings statute, which applies well beyond the class action 
context, can hardly be viewed as a response to the specific inefficiency issues 
identified in this context.  
 256. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(A)(3) (2012).  
 257. Id. art. 596(B). 
 258. Fourteen days compared to 30 days. 
 259. By not requiring that notice be given to putative class members upon the 
denial of class certification, this Comment’s proposal avoids a distinct controversy 
in federal jurisprudence. Federal courts across the country have come to very 
different conclusions on the propriety of court-rendered notice to putative 
plaintiffs where class certification has been denied. Compare Rineheart v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 190 F.R.D. 197, 201-02 (M.D. La. 1999), with Pearson v. Ecological 
Sci. Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176-77 (5th Cir.), and Tosti v. City of L.A., 754 F.2d 
1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 260. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(B); id. art. 596 cmt. d. 
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Asbestos Workers–Monahan models cause and ends the risk of a 
plaintiff losing a claim in the period between an adverse class 
certification decision and a final disposition of the certification 
question. Under Taylor, a putative plaintiff must file a placeholder 
action to avoid the running of the statute of limitations; no other 
mechanism can suspend the limitations period. Despite the limited 
extension of tolling granted in National Asbestos Workers and 
Monahan, the inherent uncertainty involved in the dual requirement 
of an attempted appeal and a discretionary stay also encourages 
placeholder actions. However, if tolling were to continue through 
the period in which a Rule 23(f) appeal can be made, there is no 
need for a placeholder action whatsoever, either as a last resort for 
tolling (Taylor) or as a hedge against the named plaintiff and a 
district court’s behavior (National Asbestos Workers–Monahan).261 
The 14-day extension of tolling also furthers Rule 23(f)’s goal of 
achieving a cost-effective resolution of the class certification 
decision because litigants need not file and courts need not process 
redundant actions filed for the sole purpose of continuing the toll to 
observe an appeal.262  
Because the tolling would cease at the end of the 14-day period 
where there is neither an appeal by the named plaintiff nor an 
intervention and appeal by a putative plaintiff, this proposal 
eliminates the fear of plaintiffs sleeping on claims as expressed in 
Armstrong.263 The extension of tolling for a minimum of 14 days 
does not prejudice defendants. A properly pled class action puts 
defendants on notice of the “number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs.”264 Because Rule 23(f) provides a definite period 
for appeal, defendants are aware of the window for challenging a 
denial of class certification and cannot claim surprise from a timely 
request for interlocutory relief. Continuing tolling for a minimum of 
                                                                                                             
 261. The Louisiana Legislature established an automatic suspension of 
prescription for precisely this reason. See id. art. 596 cmt. c (“The provision 
created confusion because Article 592(A)(3)(h) authorizes an appeal from a 
judgment denying certification and Article 596 does not provide that its thirty-day 
suspensive periods are subject to further suspension by the articles on appeal. 
Given this uncertainty, a cautious plaintiff's attorney receiving notice of an adverse 
ruling on class certification might needlessly file an individual suit for his client 
during the period for taking or completing an appeal to avoid a possible 
prescription exception.” (emphasis added)).  
 262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., 
subdiv. (f). 
 263. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 
1998) (en banc). 
 264. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974). 
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14 days does not create a cognizable risk of evidence becoming 
stale.265  
This proposal also lends itself to practical application. The 
Armstrong court expressed concern over the extension of tolling in 
light of real-world litigation strategies.266 However, an automatic 
stay separates tolling questions from, for example, complications 
involving the named plaintiff settling after certification denial.267 A 
district court’s denial of certification begins a set period for parties 
to consider and execute litigation strategies, and tolling can only 
continue after a timely Rule 23(f) appeal.  
When a Rule 23(f) appeal is entertained, tolling through the 
ultimate resolution of the question ends the arbitrary asymmetry that 
can result from a district court’s initial decision on class 
certification.268 This rule places all plaintiffs and defendants on the 
same footing and ends the need for putative plaintiffs to take 
additional steps to participate in the appellate process when a district 
court denies class certification. Moreover, this approach avoids 
novel questions of tolling after a circuit court’s decision.269 A 
defendant is no more prejudiced by continued tolling under this 
proposal than was the defendant in Wal-Mart v. Dukes; if a 
defendant is not prejudiced when she appeals certification through 
the Supreme Court, she is equally not prejudiced when a plaintiff 
does the same.270 
C. The Proposal’s Relationship with Scholarly Literature 
1. Scholarly Literature on the Instant Issue 
Very little has been written on the relationship between class 
action tolling and Rule 23(f). This area of the law is still developing; 
as recently as 2010, one scholar, Joseph M. McLaughlin, recognized 
that “[t]he intersection of Rule 23(f) and statute of limitations tolling 
for class members is emerging as an area of controversy.”271 
McLaughlin is one of the few scholars to directly discuss this issue. 
After correctly noting that Rule 23(f) is silent on the issue of tolling 
                                                                                                             
 265. As a comparison, article 596 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
extends tolling for a full 30 days after a notice of a final adverse ruling on class 
certification. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(A)(3).  
 266. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390.  
 267. Id.  
 268. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 269. See supra note 235.  
 270. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 271. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 126, § 3:15, at 470.  
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and recognizing many of the cases discussed above, McLaughlin 
argued that 
[t]he better view is that adopted by courts that have 
concluded that the highly discretionary nature of Rule 23(f) 
appeals, and the uncertainty over whether a putative 
representative will even seek an interlocutory appeal under 
Rule 23(f), support adherence to the certainty yielded by the 
rule ending the toll when the district court denies class 
certification.272 
McLaughlin’s reliance on the “uncertainty” inherent in Rule 23(f) is 
misplaced. As discussed in Parts III.A.1 and III.B, uncertainty as to 
the continuation of tolling after a certification denial creates an 
incentive to file redundant placeholder actions, an anathema to the 
policies of efficiency and economy underlying American Pipe and 
Rule 23.273 Uncertainty as to a putative plaintiff’s tolling status is a 
justification for an automatic extension of tolling, not an argument 
against it.274 
Indeed, McLaughlin’s presentation of jurisprudential arguments 
supporting the cessation of tolling when the district court denies 
certification contains now obsolete justifications. For instance, 
McLaughlin quotes Armstrong for the proposition that “[t]he 
extended tolling period may be expected to prejudice many 
defendants because [putative] plaintiffs will be able to choose when 
to file their suits . . . leav[ing] decisions regarding the tolling period 
in the hands, not of the court, but of plaintiffs and putative class 
members.”275 
The Armstrong court rendered this opinion at a time when 
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions was not 
practical, leaving the question until an appeal from final judgment. 
Yet, neither the proposal outlined in this Comment nor in the cases 
extending tolling during the pendency of a Rule 23(f) appeal allow a 
putative plaintiff to ambush a defendant with an untimely claim after 
final judgment. Even the National Asbestos Workers decision, cited 
by McLaughlin as a case opposed to Armstrong’s central 
                                                                                                             
 272. Id. at 471.  
 273. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Crown, 
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1983).  
 274. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596 cmt. c.  
 275. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 126, § 3:15, at 469 (third and fourth 
alterations in original) (quoting Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 
1374, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be 
clear, McLaughlin identified this passage as a jurisprudential argument made in 
favor of ending tolling upon the denial of certification.  
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reasoning,276 required a timely Rule 23(f) appeal for continued 
tolling.277 Fear of tolling beyond a distant final judgment fails to 
recognize the possibilities created by Rule 23(f). 
2. A Comparative Approach 
This Comment’s proposed rule is bolstered by the five-part 
analysis used by the Tenth Circuit in State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Company v. Boellstorff278 and developed by Caleb Brown 
on another tolling question.279 Brown wrote his article after the 
Tenth Circuit weighed in on a putative plaintiff’s ability to claim 
tolling after she de facto opts out of a class by filing an independent 
action before a ruling on class certification.280 Many courts have 
held that a plaintiff retroactively waives a class action’s tolling 
benefit when she initiates an independent action after the filing of a 
class action but before an initial class certification decision.281 Other 
decisions, including the Boellstorff opinion that prompted Brown’s 
piece, have held that no waiver of tolling occurs when a plaintiff 
files an independent action after a class action is filed but before a 
certification decision.282 In arguing that the latter position is correct, 
Brown examined the Boellstorff court’s reasoning under five 
analytical prongs: (1) the language of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
of American Pipe and Crown, (2) the degree to which the Tenth 
Circuit’s rule conforms to the representative nature of the class 
action, (3) the need to ensure notice to defendants, (4) the need to 
balance the protection of plaintiffs with protection for defendants, 
and (5) the effect of the new rule on judicial efficiency.283 Though 
this Comment deals with a fundamentally different tolling issue, 
                                                                                                             
 276. See id. § 3:15, at 470–71. 
 277. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Monahan v. City of 
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 
2004). 
 278. 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 279. See generally Brown, supra note 51.  
 280. Id.  
 281. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568–69 
(6th Cir. 2005); Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983); In re 
Enron Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715 (S.D. Tex. 
2006); Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F. Supp. 2d 793, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 282. See, e.g., Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229; In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation 
Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 
245, 254 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 
2008 WL 2692674, at *3 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008). 
 283. See Brown, supra note 51, at 810–15.  
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Brown’s five-part test for assessing a proposed extension of tolling 
supports its proposed rule. 
a. The Language of the Supreme Court  
As Brown noted, a close reading of American Pipe and Crown 
can lead to multiple interpretations.284 The most relevant language 
comes from Crown and states that “[o]nce the statute of limitations 
has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative 
class until class certification is denied.”285 Read narrowly, this 
statement can be understood as mandating the cessation of tolling 
upon a district court’s denial of certification insofar as class 
certification has been denied.286 The same statement can be broadly 
read as necessitating a final determination of the question, thereby 
including appeals. While this language can plausibly support or 
reject this Comment’s proposed rule, it is at least worth noting that 
the Crown opinion does not foreclose on it. 
b. The Representative Nature of the Class Action 
Brown next examined the Boellstorff court’s assertion that its 
rule comports with the class action’s representative nature.287 By 
granting tolling through the entire 14-day period for a Rule 23(f) 
appeal, this Comment’s proposed rule places the putative plaintiff in 
a very similar position to the named plaintiff after the denial of 
certification. Like the named plaintiff, the putative plaintiff may 
appeal the decision after intervention or approach the defendant for 
settlement purposes with a more accurate understanding of the class 
certification question. Most importantly, and again like the named 
plaintiff, the putative plaintiff need not immediately act to restart the 
toll. This Comment’s proposed rule advances the representative 
nature of the class action.  
                                                                                                             
 284. See id. at 810. 
 285. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).  
 286. Id. The Armstrong court argued for such a narrow reading, stating that it 
was unreasonable to read the word denied to mean “denied, appealed, denied 
again, appealed (perhaps) again, and denied again.” Armstrong v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Armstrong court then 
pointed to the Crown Court’s statement that disappointed putative plaintiffs may 
“intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action” after class certification has been 
denied by the district court to suggest that the Crown court never intended to 
continue the toll beyond the initial denial of class certification. Id. (quoting Crown, 
462 U.S. at 354) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Wells v. FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 4:10CV2080 JCH, 2011 WL 1769665, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. May 9, 2011).  
 287. See Brown, supra note 51, at 811.  
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c. Notice to Defendants  
Brown also looked at the degree to which the new rule 
maintained proper notice for defendants.288 As discussed above and 
noted in American Pipe, a properly pled class action complaint will 
alert defendants to the “number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs.”289 Should a defendant prevail at the trial level 
on the question of class certification, she is on notice that a Rule 
23(f) appeal may be made within 14 days. Aware of the number and 
generic identities of putative plaintiffs and of the window for 
intervention and appeal, imagining that a putative plaintiff could 
surprise a defendant is difficult, even if the defendant has settled 
with the named plaintiff.  
d. Balancing “Nontolling” for Plaintiffs and the Risk of Stale 
Evidence 
Brown recognized that the harm that an extension of tolling 
seeks to correct must not come at the expense of forcing defendants 
to face stale claims.290 As Calderon shows, the current approach 
allows the loss of valid claims simply because a class was 
erroneously and initially denied class certification.291 To help avert 
this injustice, as well as promote efficient, cost-effective litigation 
pursuant to the goals of Rule 23 and the rationale of Rule 23(f), this 
Comment’s proposed rule extends tolling for a minimum of 14 days, 
creating little, if any, additional risk of stale evidence.292 While 
tolling under the proposed rule could continue through a final 
decision, a defendant is at no more of a disadvantage than she would 
be if she were the party appealing under Rule 23(f).293 
e. The Extension of Tolling and Its Effect on Judicial Efficiency 
Finally, Brown recognized that any new tolling rule must not 
inject inefficiency into Rule 23 proceedings.294 One of the primary 
reasons for this Comment’s proposal is to remove the current 
                                                                                                             
 288. See id. at 812.  
 289. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974). 
 290. See Brown, supra note 51, at 812; see also Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388 
(citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 
(1944)).  
 291. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 292. See supra Part IV.B. 
 293. See supra Parts III.A.3, IV.B.  
 294. See Brown, supra note 51, at 814. 
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incentive to file redundant actions after class certification denial.295 
Indeed, every approach presented in this Comment outside the new 
proposal interjects inefficiency into Rule 23(f) proceedings. This 
Comment’s proposed rule falls well within this Brown criterion. 
CONCLUSION 
The class action is an important tool in modern American 
litigation. At times, the class action is the only realistic method by 
which a group can vindicate a wrong, to say nothing of the class 
action’s value as a tool of judicial efficiency. The rule proposed in 
this Comment seeks to remedy a defect that has lingered far too long 
in jurisprudence. That parties can be ejected from an action based 
merely on a district court’s mistaken class certification decision is 
evidence enough of the need for change. That the rule undermines 
the policies underlying Rule 23 when many of its initial 
justifications withered over a decade ago demonstrates the serious 
need for a new approach. Whether through the application of this 
Comment’s proposed rule or through other means, a correction to 
the problems inherent in ending tolling after a denial of class 
certification is long overdue.  
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